(LANA) Analysis: Libya Faces Long-Standing Political Challenges — Is the Crisis Heading Toward Change or a Reshaping of the Political Process?

Tripoli, August 10, 2026 (LANA) – Libya’s political crisis is entering a more sensitive phase in the coming days, with political and international movements and meetings taking place concurrently that could help determine the direction of the United Nations-sponsored political process and clarify whether the next phase will involve rearranging the existing executive authority or introducing broader amendments to the political process and its rules.

In this context, attention is focused on three interconnected developments: meetings of the “Small Group” associated with the UN-led process, the Boulos initiative, and the anticipated political activity in Paris, in addition to the UN Security Council session and the forthcoming UN briefing on Libya.

These developments derive their importance from the fact that they come at a time when the United Nations Support Mission in Libya is seeking to move the political process forward, particularly with regard to the legal and institutional foundations for elections.

The “Small Group” held its sixth meeting in Tunis on July 14, where it discussed a mechanism for reaching consensus on the presidency of the High National Elections Commission, in addition to completing the drafting of the agreement on the legal framework for the presidential and legislative elections. The group then agreed to resume its meetings during the first week of August to complete the outstanding issues.

This places the upcoming developments before a political test that goes beyond merely reaching agreement on names or positions of authority, to testing the ability of Libyan and international actors to produce a process that genuinely leads to ending the transitional phase, rather than reorganizing it in a new form.

Here, the importance of the Security Council session and the anticipated UN briefing becomes evident, as they will serve as indicators of the nature of the international position toward the next phase, and whether international support will focus on completing the current roadmap, modifying some of its elements, or pushing toward new political arrangements, particularly the initiative of Massad Boulos.

During her briefing to the Security Council on June 18, 2026, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Libya, Hanna Tetteh, affirmed that the political process had regained some momentum but remained fragile. She stressed that continuing the process in its current form would not be sufficient without creating the necessary political and security conditions for holding elections.

Therefore, the question imposed by the current phase is not merely whether Libya is heading toward a change in government, but rather who will shape the rules of the next phase and what guarantees will prevent it from reproducing previous crises.

Government Crisis or Political System Crisis?

For years, Libya has been caught in a recurring cycle of transitional governments, temporary arrangements, and political understandings that have failed to reach a final settlement.

With every political or institutional crisis, the discussion returns to forming a new government or modifying the existing one, while fundamental issues, foremost among them unifying state institutions, ending the division, and holding general elections, remain hostage to political agreements.

The continuation of this pattern has shifted the focus of the debate from the question of building institutions to the question of changing those who occupy them. Changing the government has, in many cases, come to appear as an alternative to addressing the causes that led to its difficulties.

This does not mean that the performance of successive governments is not part of the problem. Rather, it means that placing sole responsibility for the continuation of the crisis on the government may obscure a broader dysfunction related to the very rules through which power is produced. When institutions are divided, the constitutional and electoral foundations are disputed, and oversight and accountability mechanisms have limited effectiveness, changing officials alone becomes incapable of producing sustainable change.

Recycling Figures or Changing the Rules of the Game?

One of the most prominent criticisms accompanying the management of the Libyan crisis over the past years has been the repeated reliance on the same figures and forces to produce new political arrangements. When one settlement fails, efforts often begin to find another settlement involving actors who were present in previous stages. This has reinforced among a segment of Libyans the feeling that the political process is redistributing positions more than it is rebuilding the foundations of the state.

In this context, the expression “recycling failure” has become widespread in public discourse as an expression of frustration over the continued presence of certain figures and entities in the political scene despite the succession of crises.

However, reducing the crisis to individuals would itself be an oversimplification of the problem. Replacing an official or forming a new government does not, in itself, address institutional division, end the overlap of political, security, and economic interests, or provide a stable mechanism for the transfer of power. Accordingly, the issue is not only about who leaves the scene and who enters it, but rather about the rules governing the process of entering and leaving in the first place.

Libyan Responsibility and the International Role

These challenges cannot be separated from the role played by international and regional actors in the Libyan file. Countries involved in the crisis have influenced its political and security trajectories to varying degrees, while the United Nations Support Mission in Libya has played an overt role for years in sponsoring political dialogues and understandings.

The international role has, at various stages, helped prevent wider escalation and opened channels for dialogue. However, the continued political and institutional division, in contrast, demonstrates the limits of international sponsorship alone in producing a stable settlement.

From this perspective, the problem lies in the fact that external intervention does not operate independently of the domestic reality. It encounters local forces that possess interests and the ability to exert influence, while some Libyan actors benefit from the continuation of transitional arrangements and the existing balance of power. Consequently, placing full responsibility for the crisis on external actors ignores the responsibility of local forces, just as placing responsibility solely on Libyans ignores the international and regional influence that has accompanied the crisis for years.

What Comes After the Next Government?

In light of this, the most important question in the next phase may not be: Who will be the next prime minister? The more important question is: What will prevent the next government from becoming merely another link in the chain of transitional governments?

Overcoming the crisis requires, before changing individuals, addressing the environment that has repeatedly reproduced the crisis — beginning with unifying state institutions, moving through establishing a clear legal and political framework for elections, and ending with the existence of oversight and judicial institutions capable of exercising their role in protecting public funds and holding officials accountable.

It also requires a political settlement that establishes a clear time limit for the transitional phase, so that temporary arrangements do not turn into a permanent situation that reproduces itself whenever agreement on elections proves impossible.

Through the roadmap led by the UN Support Mission in Libya, the United Nations is seeking to push the parties toward completing the elements required for elections and reunifying institutions. However, the success of this process remains dependent on the willingness of Libyan forces to make genuine concessions and on the international community’s ability to provide coherent political support that does not merely manage the crisis but instead pushes toward ending it.

As the upcoming political developments draw closer, Libya appears to be facing a test that goes beyond forming a government or modifying an existing one. The real test lies in the ability of local and international actors to move from managing the transitional phase to ending it, and from redistributing power among elites to building stable rules for its transfer.

In a country possessing the resources and potential necessary to build a stable state, the continuation of political and institutional division is no longer merely a problem with the performance of a particular government. Rather, it becomes an indicator of a deeper dysfunction in the way power is produced and the state is governed.

Therefore, the challenge facing the next phase lies not only in selecting a new government, but in putting an end to the logic of the “temporary government” as a permanent method of governance, and in building a process in which changes of government result from stable political and constitutional mechanisms, rather than serving as a means of managing a crisis that repeatedly returns with different names.

...(LANA)...